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1 Introduction  
In 2002, it was estimated that 11 million children (between the ages of 0-18) are living in dire poverty in 
South Africa on less than R200 per capita per month (R245 in 2002 real terms), and therefore living on 
less than half the minimal R400 per capita per month required to meet their basic needs, and 14.3 million 
children are living in poverty on less than R400 per capita per month (R490 in 2002 terms). Child poverty 
is on the increase. Between 1995 and 1999 the rate of child poverty in South Africa on a poverty line of 
R400 per capita per month increased from 64.7% to 75.8% and the rate of children in dire poverty 
calculated on a poverty line of R200 per capita per month increased by 19.2% from 38.9% to 58.1%.
4 
 
These children face shortages of food, clothing, and shelter. They also lack access to basic services. In the 
light of this, their basic human dignity and other fundamental rights are denied.
5 
Therefore, it is not 
surprising that most of South Africa's children lack basic shelter and are often homeless. This prevailing 
manifestation of poverty needs to be addressed effectively. One way of addressing this is through a rights 
based approach whereby socioeconomic rights are realised to the poorest of the poor.
6  
1    This article forms part of a National Research Foundation Project titled: "The utilisation of socioeconomic rights to alleviate 
the plight of poor children in South Africa." The financial assistance of the National Research Foundation: Social Sciences 
and Humanities towards this research is hereby acknowledged. Opinions expressed and conclusions arrived at are those of 
the authors and are not necessarily to be attributed to the National Research Foundation.  
2    North-West University (Potchefstroom Campus).  
3    North-West University (Potchefstroom Campus).  
4    Joint Submission to the Portfolio Committee 2003 http://www.pmg.org.za/docs/2003/appendices/030922joint.htm Mar 2004.  
5    Compare Government of the Republic of South Africa v Grootboom 2000 11 BCLR 1169 (CC) par [23]. Hereafter referred to 
as the Grootboom Constitutional Court case.    
6    Jansen van Rensburg 2002 PER http://www.puk.ac.za/law/per/documents/special%20edition%202002/linda.doc Mar 2004. 
See Goldewijk and de Gaay Fortman Where Needs Meet Rights.  
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For the first time in South African history the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996
7
 
entrenches numerous socio-economic rights. One of these socio-economic rights is contained in section 
26 that grants everyone the right to have access to adequate housing and section 28 that grants every child 
the additional right to basic shelter among others.   
This article will focus on the utilisation of the right to shelter of the child to alleviate poverty. Essential to 
this discussion is an effective understanding of the right to basic shelter as entrenched by section 28 of the 
Constitution in conjunction with the right of access to adequate housing conferred on everyone by virtue 
of section 26.  This will be achieved by studying the general working of such rights including their 
limitations and enforcement.    
2  Poverty affecting South African children  
Poverty can be defined as the condition of having insufficient resources or income to enable a person to 
consume the goods and services required for a secure and healthy life. In its extreme form, poverty is a 
lack of basic human resources, such as adequate housing or shelter, clean water, nutritious food and 
health services.
8
 Poverty involves more than the suffering associated with lack of income. It also pertains 
to an inability to develop human capabilities, and to suffering attendant on physical insecurity and abuse 
and economic vulnerability.
9 
 
Poverty has many causes, some of them very basic. In most cases, the causes and effects of poverty 
interact, so that what makes people poor also creates conditions that keep them poor. The accepted 
general factors that may lead to poverty include: overpopulation; the unequal distribution of resources in 
the world economy; inability to meet high standards of living and costs of living; inadequate education 
and employment opportunities; environmental degradation; certain economic and demographic trends; 
and welfare incentives.
10 
 
In the South African context, a number of factors contributing to the existence of poverty can be 
identified.  These are:
11 
 
7    Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996.  Hereafter referred to as the Constitution.  
8    Jackson and Jackson Introduction to Political Science 407; Venter Government and Politics 322. 
9    Venter Government and Politics 407; Streak 2000 http://www.idasa.org.za May 2003.  
10   Streak 2001 http://www.idasa.org.za May 2003.  
11   May 1998 http://www.und.ac.za May 2003.  
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• The impact of apartheid, which stripped people of their assets (especially land), distorted 
economic markets and social institutions through racial discrimination and resulted in violence and 
destabilisation;  
• The undermining of the asset base of individuals, households and communities, through ill-
health, over-crowding, environmental degradation, the miss use of resources, discrimination, and social 
isolation; and  
• The impact of a disabling state, which included the behaviour and attitudes of government 
officials, the absence of information concerning rights, roles and responsibilities and the lack of 
accountability at all levels of government.  
 
Poverty has wide-ranging and often devastating effects on children. Many of its effects, such as 
homelessness and malnutrition, result directly from having too little income or too few resources. Certain 
studies have also concluded that children who live a life of poverty are more susceptible to an adult life of 
crime and other problems such as depression, which can contribute to criminal behaviour. Furthermore, 
poverty tends to perpetuate itself. In many cases, poor children have become accustomed to the mindset 
that keeps them from getting out of poverty. These children then grow up to be poor adults earning lower 
than average incomes.
12 
 
3  The implementation of children's socio-economic rights to alleviate poverty  
It is submitted that significant progress can be made in the fight against poverty through effective 
realisation and enforcement of socio-economic rights, especially those conferred upon children.  The 
Constitutional Court
13 
has recently confirmed this when it stated that the realisation of socio-economic 
rights is key to the advancement of a democratic society based on human dignity, freedom, and equality.  
The utilisation of children's socio-economic rights as a response to poverty requires a multi-sectoral, 
multi-faceted approach, which relies heavily on  
 
 
12   Streak 2001 http://www.idasa.org.za May 2003, see also Motala 2001  
  http://www.childrensrightscentre.co.za/topics/poverty.html May 2003; Committee of Inquiry into a Comprehensive System 
of Social Security for South Africa Protecting the Children 55.  
13   Grootboom Constitutional Court case par [23].  
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social policies and incorporates poverty alleviating programmes, integrated development plans, capacity 
development of communities, service delivery and social security.
14  
 
4  Children's socio-economic rights in the South African Constitution  
The Constitution entrenches children's rights in section 28.
15
 The purpose of section 28 is to protect 
children in situations where they are particularly vulnerable. In this respect, the additional rights in 
section 28 enhance the protection afforded to everyone (including children) in the rest of the Bill of 
Rights. Section 28(1)(c) entrenches socio-economic rights for children that supplement the general socio-
economic rights to adequate housing, health care, nutrition and social security.
16 
This section places a duty 
on the state to ensure that a child is provided with these basic needs. The state must also ensure that the 
family of the child is provided with the means to support those needs.
17 
 
4.1  Children's right to basic shelter  
4.1.1  The state's general obligations in terms of the right to basic shelter  
Traditionally, a Constitution is only seen as a protective device in so far that it places a duty on the state 
to refrain from interfering with the rights of individuals.
18
14   Motala 2001 
 This limited notion is rejected by the 
Constitution, which includes an obligation clause in the form of section 7(2).  
 
 
 
http://www.childrensrightscentre.co.za/topics/poverty.html May 2003.  
15  S 28 of the Constitution reads: "(1) Every child has the right - (a) to a name and a nationality from birth;  
  (b) to family care, parental care, or appropriate alternative care when removed from the family environment; (c) to basic 
nutrition, shelter, basic health care services, and social services; (d) to be protected from maltreatment, neglect, abuse, or 
degradation; (e) to be protected from exploitative labour practices; (f) not to be required or permitted to perform work or 
provide services that - (i) are inappropriate for a person of that child's age; or (ii) place at risk the child's well-being, 
education, physical or mental health, or spiritual, moral, or social development; (g) not to be detained except as a measure 
of last resort, in which case, in addition to the rights a child enjoys under sections 12 and 35, the child may be detained only 
for the shortest appropriate period of time, and has the right to be - (i) kept separately from detained persons over the age of 
18 years; and (ii) treated in a manner, and kept in conditions, that take account of the child's age; (h) to have a legal 
practitioner assigned to the child by the state, and at state expense, in civil proceedings affecting the child, if substantial 
injustice would otherwise result; and  
  (i) not to be used directly in armed conflict, and to be protected in times of armed conflict. (2) A child's best interest is of 
paramount importance in every matter concerning the child. (3) In this section, "child" means a person under the age of 18 
years."  
16   Own emphasis.  
17   De Waal, Currie and Erasmus Bill of Rights 457; Davis, Cheadle and Haysom Fundamental Rights 265-266.  
18   De Waal, Currie and Erasmus Bill of Rights 433; De Vos 1997 SAJHR 78; Jansen van Rensburg and Olivier 2001 Law, 
Democracy and Development 87.   
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Section 7(2) reads: "The state must respect, protect, promote, and fulfil the rights in the Bill of Rights."  
Therefore, in terms of section 7(2), the state no longer only has a duty to respect the socioeconomic rights 
of children, but also to protect, promote and fulfil them along with the other rights entrenched in the Bill 
of Rights.  
This obligation to respect the right to basic shelter entrenches the traditional notion that the state must 
refrain from interfering with the rights of individuals, in other words, the state must respect the autonomy 
of the individual.
19
 Thus, on a primary level, the state must refrain from infringing a child's right to 
shelter. This duty also entails that the state may not promulgate legislation, nor act in a manner which 
would deprive a child of his or her right to basic shelter. An example of infringement of the duty to 
respect the right to basic shelter would be where children in child headed households are evicted from 
temporary shelter, or where parents are arbitrarily deprived of their access to adequate housing causing 
them not to be able to provide their children with shelter.  
This obligation to protect the right to basic shelter places a positive duty on the state to ensure the 
effective enjoyment of the right. This entails that the state must create a legal framework in which the 
right to basic shelter can be realised without undue interference from other private parties.
20
 Thus, the 
state must protect individuals from interference with their social and economic well-being.
21
 For example, 
the state must ensure that children and their families are not evicted arbitrarily from their shelter or other 
forms of housing by private persons.  
The duty to promote and fulfil the right to basic shelter entails that the state must ensure that all people 
are aware of their rights, whereas the duty to fulfil requires positive assistance from the state to ensure the 
full realisation of the rights in question.
22 
 
Depending on the formulation of the rights, they could include a duty of the state to provide resources to 
fulfil an individual's basic social and economic needs directly.
23
 However, most socio-economic rights in 
the Constitution are internally limited. For example, section 26(2)  
 
19   De Vos 1997 SAJHR 80; Jansen van Rensburg and Olivier 2001 Law, Democracy and Development 88;  
  De Vos 1995 SAPL 253; Himes Implementing the CRC 15.  
20   De Vos 1997 SAJHR 83; De Vos 1995 SAPL 254; Himes Implementing the CRC 15-16. See also Jansen van Rensburg and 
Olivier 2001 Law, Democracy and Development 89.  
21   De Vos 1997 SAJHR 83.  
22   De Vos 1997 SAJHR 86; De Vos 1995 SAPL 255; Himes Implementing the CRC 16.  
23   De Vos 1997 SAJHR 86, De Vos 1995 SAPL 255; Himes Implementing the CRC 16.  
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states that "the state must take reasonable legislative and other measures, within its available resources, to 
achieve the progressive realisation of [the right to adequate housing]".  
The effective realisation of children's socio-economic rights has proven to be no simple matter and the 
seemingly less limited wording of section 28(1)(c) has not improved the situation. The question that 
should be asked in this regard is who is primarily responsible for providing basic shelter for children as 
envisaged by section 28(1)(c) of the Constitution?  
In terms of the common law, parents have the primary duty to provide shelter, food, clothing and basic 
support to their children. This duty has been incorporated into legislation such as the Child Care Act 74 of 
1983,
24 
which states that parents who are able to provide care for their children but fail to do so are guilty 
of a criminal offence.
25 
Therefore, section 28(1)(b), which provides for the right to parental care and 
family life, together with section 8(3)
26
 of the Constitution provide that the primary responsibility to care 
for children rests on the parents. The state will only intervene when the parents are unable to fulfil their 
responsibilities.
27
 This is in line with the international rules formulated in articles 18 and 27(3) of the 
United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child, and has recently been confirmed by the 
Constitutional Court in the Grootboom case.
28 
 
When reading section 28(1)(b) together with section 28(1)(c), the question may be asked whether the 
state, when obligated to intervene and provide children with basic shelter, is also obligated to provide 
shelter to their parents. To answer this question, the relationship between section 26 and 28(1)(c) must be 
examined.  
24   Child Care Act 74 of 1983.  Hereafter referred to as the 1983 Child Care Act.  
25   Section 50(2) of the 1983 Child Care Act.  
26   The horizontal application of the Bill of Rights is at present a heavily debated subject. For purposes of this article, a full 
discussion is not necessary. S 8(3) of the Constitution reads: "A provision of the Bill of Rights binds a natural or juristic 
person if, and to the extent that, it is applicable, taking into account the nature of the right and any duty imposed by the 
right."  
27   De Waal, Currie and Erasmus Bill of Rights 457; Davis, Cheadle and Haysom Fundamental Rights 265-266.  
28   Grootboom Constitutional Court case par [75].  
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4.1.2  The relationship between section 26 and section 28(1)(c)  
The relationship between sections 26 and 28(1)(c) has been addressed by the High Court in Grootboom v 
Oostenberg Municipality and Others,
29
 and subsequently by the Constitutional Court in the Grootboom 
case.  
Mrs Irene Grootboom along with the other applicants
30
 were rendered homeless after being evicted 
illegally from their informal settlements, which were situated on land earmarked for low-cost housing by 
the Cape Metro Land Programme. In the application before the High Court, they pleaded for an order 
requiring local government to provide them with adequate basic shelter or housing until they obtained 
permanent accommodation or other relief.
31
 The applicants firstly based their claim on section 26 of the 
Constitution, which provides everyone the right of access to adequate housing, which is limited by section 
26(2). Secondly, the claim was based on section 28(1)(c), which provides children the right to basic 
shelter.
32 
 
The High Court drew a distinction between section 26 and section 28(1)(c). Concerning the right of 
access to adequate housing, the court concluded that this provision does place a duty on the state to 
provide for the progressive realisation of the right to access to adequate housing within budget 
constraints.
33 
Thus, according to the Court's interpretation of section 26(1) in light of section 26(2), these 
provisions do not impose an obligation on the state to provide housing to everyone on demand.
34
 The 
simple reason for this conclusion is the fact that the realisation of any socio-economic right is subject to 
the availability of resources.  
The second part of the High Court judgement addressed the children's shelter claim in terms of section 
28(1)(c). The Court held that this provision imposed an obligation on the state to provide shelter to 
children if the parents were unable to do so. The Court went on to say:  
29   Grootboom v Oostenberg Municipality 2000 3 BCLR 277 (C). Hereafter referred to as the Grootboom High Court case.  
30   The applicants were 510 children and 390 adults. Mrs Grootboom brought the application before the High Court.  
31   Grootboom High Court case par 227A, and see the Grootboom case par [4] and [13]. Notably, the Constitutional Court made 
no distinction between the term "housing" and the term "shelter".  
32   Grootboom High Court case par 278B.  
33   Grootboom High Court case par 286G-H.  
34   Grootboom High Court case par 286H-J. See also De Waal, Currie and Erasmus Bill of Rights 464.  
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An order, which enforces a child's right to shelter, should take account of the need of the child to be accompanied by 
his or her parent.  Such an approach would be in accordance with the spirit and purport of section 28 as a whole.
35  
 
The order made by the Court can be summarised as follows: (a) children must be afforded rudimentary 
protection from the elements in terms of section 28(1)(c) by the state; (b) the applicant parents are entitled 
to be accommodated with their children in the mentioned shelter, until the parents are able to shelter their 
own children; and (c) the state is bound to provide this rudimentary shelter irrespective of the availability 
of resources.
36 
 
Government appealed to the Constitutional Court against this decision.  
Even though the High Court order was made in terms of section 28, the Constitutional Court found it 
appropriate to analyse the obligations imposed by section 26 in order to determine whether the Cape 
Metro Land Programme complied with constitutional requirements.
37
 The Court found that section 26 
does impose a positive duty on the state to provide everyone, including children, with access to adequate 
housing. However, this duty is subject to the provisions of section 26(2), therefore, the state must provide 
for the realisation of this right by means of reasonable legislative and other measures in a progressive 
manner within its available resources.
38
 Thus, the Court concurred with the High Court's conclusion that 
no one is entitled to access to housing on demand. However, the Cape Metro Land Programme as the 
measure taken in order to realise the right to access to adequate housing, was analysed by the Court and 
found to be unreasonable due to the fact that it did not provide for emergency housing for people in 
desperate need, i.e. the children.
39 
 
The Constitutional Court then turned to section 28(1)(c) and the right to shelter. The Court rejected the 
High Court's interpretation of section 28(1)(c), which allowed parents to receive shelter also along with 
their children. The Court reasoned that the decision would produce an anomalous result:
40 
 
The carefully constructed constitutional scheme for progressive realisation of  
socio-economic rights would make little sense if it could be trumped in every  
 
 
 
35   Grootboom High Court case par 288D-F.  
36   Grootboom High Court case par 293H-J.  
37   Grootboom Constitutional Court case par [20].  
38   Grootboom Constitutional Court case par [34-69].  
39   Grootboom Constitutional Court case par [69].  
40   Grootboom Constitutional Court case par [71].  
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case by the rights of children to get shelter on demand from the state. Moreover, children would be stepping-stones to 
housing for their parents instead of being valued for who they are.  
 
Section 28(1)(c) must be read together with section 28(1)(b), which ensures that children are properly 
cared for by their parents or family, and that they receive appropriate alternative care by the state in the 
absence of parents or family.
41
 According to the Constitutional Court,
42 
subsection (1)(b) defines those 
responsible for giving care, and subsection (1)(c) lists various aspects of the care entitlement.  It then 
follows that these provisions contemplate that the primary responsibility for care giving, such as 
providing shelter, is imposed on the parents or family of the children, and only alternatively on the state if 
the parents are unable to fulfil their duties or if the child has been removed from their care.
43
 In other 
words, the state is only obligated in terms of section 28 to provide shelter to children without parents or 
children in child-headed households, and not to children and their parents.
44 
 
This does not mean that the state has no responsibilities toward children living with their parents. The 
state must provide the legal and administrative infrastructure necessary to ensure that children are 
protected as envisaged by section 28. Passing the necessary laws, and creating enforcement mechanisms 
would normally fulfil this obligation. In addition, the state must fulfil its duties to provide families with 
access to land (section 25), access to adequate housing (section 26), as well as access to adequate health 
services, food, water, and social security
45 
(section 27) within reasonable progressively available 
resources.
46 
 
To summarise, the Constitutional Court confirmed that the primary duty to provide children with care 
such as envisaged by the Constitution in section 28(1)(c) is imposed on the parents. However, in order for 
parents to provide the primary care for children, the state must create the framework in which the right 
conferred upon everyone by section 26 can be progressively realised. Thus, the Court rectified the High 
Court's erroneous assumption that parents along with their children are entitled to shelter in terms of 
section 28(1)(c).  It is then arguable that  
 
 
 
41   Grootboom Constitutional Court case par [76].  
42   Grootboom Constitutional Court case par [76].  
43   Grootboom Constitutional Court case par [77].  
44   Grootboom Constitutional Court case par [77] and [79], this was confirmed in the Minister of Health v Treatment Action 
Campaign 2002 10 BCLR 1033 (CC) par [76-77]. Hereafter referred to as TAC case.  
45   Khosa v Minister of Social Development CCT 12/03 and Mahlaule v Minister of Social Development CCT 13/03 heard on 13 
and 30 May 2003 and decided on 4 March 2004. Hereafter referred to as the Khosa and Mahlaule case. 46 Grootboom 
Constitutional Court case par [78-79]. Also, see TAC case par [77-78].  
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the measures taken to realise section 26 indirectly provide for the realisation of section 28(1)(c). 
However, in instances where the parents of children are unable to provide the necessary care, or the 
children have been removed form parental care, the state has a direct responsibility to ensure the effective 
realisation of section 28(1)(c).   
The Constitutional Court further stated that even children do not have a right to be provided with shelter 
on demand in terms of section 28(1)(c) by the state. This entails that the state's obligations concerning this 
internally qualified right of children as envisaged by the High Court order are in some ways restricted. 
The following section will focus on the limitations placed on the state's obligations in respect of section 
28(1)(c).   
4.2 Limiting children's right to basic shelter  
It is submitted in concurrence with other writers,
47
 as well as the Grootboom case, that section 28(1)(c) is 
limited in much the same way as the other socio-economic rights in the Constitution in so far as the state 
must take reasonable legislative and other measures within available resources to realise the right to 
basic shelter progressively.  
4.2.1 Reasonable legislative and other measures  
According to the Constitutional Court in the Grootboom case, the key to the justiciability of all socio-
economic rights is the standard of reasonableness:  
 
The precise contours and content of the measures to be adopted are primarily a matter for the legislature and the 
executive. However, they must ensure that the measures they adopt are reasonable. A court considering 
reasonableness will not enquire whether other more desirable or favourable measures could have been adopted, or 
whether public money could have been better spent. The question would be whether the measures that have been 
adopted are reasonable. It is necessary to recognise that a wide range of possible measures could be adopted by the 
state to meet its obligations. Many of these measures would satisfy the  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
47   Davis, Cheadle and Haysom Fundamental Rights 270; De Vos 1995 SAPL 256.  
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requirement of reasonableness. Once it has been shown that the measures do so, this requirement is met.
48 
 
 
The formulation of the measures taken is only the first stage in meeting the state's obligation toward 
children. These measures should also be implemented and, therefore, the implementation should be 
reasonable. An otherwise reasonable measure that is not implemented reasonably will not constitute 
constitutional compliance.
49
 Therefore, the Court stated in the Grootboom case that measures taken, which 
ignore the plight of those most in need (i.e. the children) could not be reasonable because it would be in 
conflict with the constitutional obligation to respect inter alia human dignity.
50 
 
This qualification provides for the formulation and implementation of legislative and other measures in 
order to realise the right to have access to adequate housing. The question is whether legislative measures 
are sufficient, or whether the incorporation of other measures is mandatory.
51
 In the Grootboom case,
52 
the 
Court concluded that legislative measures by themselves would not be sufficient to constitute 
constitutional compliance, therefore, legislative measures will most likely be supported by programmes 
and policies implemented by the executive. Furthermore, the legislative and other measures implemented 
must entail a coordinated and comprehensive programme determined by all three spheres of government 
in consultation with each other as contemplated by Chapter 3 of the Constitution. The Constitutional 
Court in the Grootboom case also confirmed this.
53 
 
The state's obligation to take these reasonable measures means in the first place that a legal framework 
must be created in which an individual through state assistance can realise his/her rights.
54
 De Vos
55
 
submits that this obligation also entails that the state should provide for the  
 
48   Grootboom Constitutional Court case par [41]. The importance of the standard of reasonableness has also been emphasised 
in TAC case par [68]. See also Davis, Cheadle and Haysom Fundamental Rights 347; Khosa and Mahlaule case par 48.  
49   Grootboom Constitutional Court case par [42].  
50   Grootboom Constitutional Court case par [44]. See also De Waal, Currie and Erasmus Bill of Rights 440, Davis, Cheadle and 
Haysom Fundamental Rights 348-349, Liebenberg 1995 SAJHR 365; Khosa and Mahlaule case par 72: "As far as the 
applicants (non-citizens) are concerned, the denial of the right is total and the consequences of the denial are grave. They 
are relegated to the margins of society and are deprived of what may be essential to enable them to enjoy other rights vested 
in them under the Constitution. Denying them their right under section 27(1) therefore affects them in a most fundamental 
way. In my view this denial is unfair."  
51   De Vos 1997 SAJHR 95; De Waal, Currie and Erasmus Bill of Rights 439.  
52   Grootboom Constitutional Court case par [42-43].  
53  Grootboom Constitutional Court case par [40].  
54   De Waal, Currie and Erasmus Bill of Rights 437.  
55   De Vos 1997 SAJHR 95.  
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appropriate judicial remedies to enable the rights in question to be enforced. This means that the courts 
can require explanation from the state of the measures taken to fulfil its duties. Furthermore, the courts 
may also require the state to give an account of its progress in implementing the measures. These reasons 
and explanations given by the state can also be evaluated by the courts for their reasonableness.
56 
 
4.2.2  Progressive realisation  
The term "progressive realisation" can be understood as a formulation which grants the state a margin of 
discretion in selecting the means and time frame in which the right to basic shelter must be realised. 
Furthermore, the inclusion of this phrase shows that it was contemplated that the rights could not be 
realised immediately due to their pragmatic nature.
57 
 
This provision is sometimes seen as an escape clause for the state to evade the fulfilment of its 
constitutional obligations by postponing it to some unspecified time in the future. It is submitted that this 
is not the case. The fact that the right of access to adequate housing and the right to basic shelter cannot 
be realised immediately does not alter the state's obligation to take those steps that are within its power 
immediately and other steps as soon as possible.
58
 In other words, any unreasonable delay or failure to 
exercise due diligence in adopting measures to secure access to adequate housing/shelter will not meet the 
requirements of this provision.  
In determining the purpose of this provision, the Court in the Grootboom case once again reflected 
international opinion:
59  
 
It is a necessary flexible device, reflecting the realities of the real world and the difficulties 
involved for any country in ensuring the full realisation of economic, social, and cultural rights. 
On the other hand, the phrase must be read in light of the overall objective of the Covenant, 
which is to establish clear obligations for State parties in respect of the full realisation of the 
rights in question. It thus imposes an obligation to move as expeditiously and effectively as 
possible toward that goal.  
 
 
 
 
 
56   De Waal, Currie and Erasmus Bill of Rights 439-440.  
57   Grootboom Constitutional Court case par [45]. See also De Waal, Currie and Erasmus Bill of Rights 437, 441; De Vos 1997 
SAJHR 96; Jansen van Rensburg and Olivier 2001 Law, Democracy and Development 91; Davis, Cheadle and Haysom 
Fundamental Rights 348.  
58   De Waal, Currie and Erasmus Bill of Rights 438; De Vos 1997 SAJHR 96; Davis, Cheadle and Haysom Fundamental Rights 
348.  
59   Grootboom Constitutional Court case par [45].  
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The inclusion of this provision qualifies the state's obligation by taking into account the harsh realities of 
the world. However, the state must still show that it is making progress toward the full realisation of the 
right to basic shelter.
60 
Therefore, the right to adequate housing/basic shelter may not without good reason 
be subjected to what is termed deliberately retrogressive measures.
61
 These measures are measures, which 
have the effect of denying individuals their existing access to adequate housing/shelter, water, food or 
health services.
62
 A clear example of such a violation is found in the Grootboom case where the local 
authority evicted a group of squatters including children and demolished their squatter camp without 
providing emergency alternative accommodation.
63
 Thus, the state infringed upon the rights of a group of 
children in such a way that their existing access to such shelter was diminished. This was caused by the 
fact that the state did not provide emergency shelter to the children.    
4.2.3  Within available resources  
This provision is clearly intended to avoid unrealistic demands on the state. In the Soobramoney case, the 
Court stated:
64  
 
What is apparent from these provisions is that the obligations imposed on the state by sections 
26 and 27 … are dependent upon the resources available for such purposes, and that the 
corresponding rights themselves are limited by reason of lack of resources. Given this lack of 
resources and the significant demands on them that have already been referred to, an unqualified 
obligation to meet these needs would not presently be capable of being fulfilled.  
 
This provision recognises that the extent of fulfilment of the rights reflects the practical economic and 
political reality that is the economy in which the state operates. Once again it must be stressed that this 
provision does not mean that the state can escape the fulfilment of its duties. In particular, resource 
scarcity does not relieve the state of its duty to fulfil its core  
 
 
 
60   For example, the state must show that it has paid specific attention to providing safe housing to children living in child 
headed households. De Vos 1997 SAJHR 97; De Waal, Currie and Erasmus Bill of Rights 442.  
61   United Nations Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights General Comment 3 at 45 par 9.  
     Herein after referred to as UN General Comment 3.  
62   De Waal, Currie and Erasmus Bill of Rights 434-435.  
63   UN General Comment 3 as referred to in Grootboom Constitutional Court case par [88].  
64   Soobramoney v Minister of Health, KwaZulu-Natal 1998 1 SA 765 (CC) par [11]. Hereafter referred to as the Soobramoney 
case. Quoted with approval in the Grootboom Constitutional Court case par [47].  
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minimum obligations.
65 
According to the Committee on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights,
66
 each 
state party has a minimum core obligation to ensure the satisfaction of, at the very least, minimum 
essential levels of all the socio-economic rights including the right to access to adequate housing and 
children's right to basic shelter.
67 
 
Even when resources are scarce, the obligation to ensure the minimum essential levels of the right to basic 
shelter/access to housing and other socio-economic rights does not fall away. In order to attribute its 
failure to meet its minimum core obligations, a state must demonstrate that every effort has been made to 
use all resources that are available in an effort to ensure the realisation of, at least, the minimum essential 
level of the relevant right. However, even in such circumstances the state must strive to ensure the widest 
possible enjoyment of the relevant rights.
68
 It is quite clear that the obligation to ensure progressive 
realisation and to do so within available resources are interlinked. In other words, the state cannot ensure 
the progressive realisation without taking into account the availability of resources. Moreover, the 
availability of resources will determine the pace at which these rights can be progressively realised.  
In the Grootboom case, the Court declined an open invitation to establish a minimum core obligation in 
respect of the right of access to adequate housing due to the complexity of the task.
69
 Instead, the Court 
found that the real question was whether the measures taken to realise these rights are reasonable.
70
 The 
learned Yacoob J indicated that evidence in a particular case might show that there is a minimum core of 
a particular service that should be taken into account in determining whether measures adopted by the 
state were reasonable. However, the socio-economic rights of the Constitution should not be construed as 
entitling everyone to  
 
 
 
 
 
 
65   De Vos 1997 SAJHR 97-98; Davis, Cheadle and Haysom Fundamental Rights 349; De Waal, Currie and Erasmus Bill of 
Rights 443; De Villiers 1996 TSAR 696-697; Liebenberg 1995 SAJHR 366.  
66   UN General Comment 3, as quoted by the Constitutional Court in the Grootboom case par [29].  
67   Grootboom Constitutional Court case par [31], and TAC case par [26]. See also De Waal, Currie and Erasmus Bill of Rights 
438; Davis, Cheadle and Haysom Fundamental Rights 348-349; De Vos 1997 SAJHR 98; Liebenberg 1995 SAJHR 366-
367.  
68   Grootboom Constitutional Court case par [31].  
69   Grootboom Constitutional Court case par [32] the Court explained its reason for not determining a minimum core obligation 
in terms of s 26: "It is not possible to determine the minimum threshold for the progressive realisation of the right of access 
to adequate housing without first identifying the needs and opportunities for the enjoyment of such right. These will vary 
according to factors such as income, unemployment, availability of land and poverty. All this illustrates the complexity of 
the task of determining a minimum core obligation … without having the requisite information on the needs and the 
opportunities for the enjoyment of this right. The Committee developed the concept of minimum core over many years of 
examining reports by reporting states. This Court does not have comparable information."  
70   Grootboom Constitutional Court case par [33].  
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demand that the minimum core be provided to them.
71
 Therefore, the Court treated minimum core as 
being related to reasonableness under section 26(2), and not as a self-standing right under section 26(1).
72 
 
Justice Sachs in the Soobramoney case emphasised that the state has to manage its limited resources in 
order to address the claims of people, including children, who are in need:
73  
 
The fact that resources are limited will require that the state must adopt a holistic approach 
to the larger needs of society rather than focus on the specific needs of particular 
individuals within a society.  
To summarise, the Constitutional Court found that the realisation of socio-economic rights, and by 
association, children's right to basic shelter is subject to, inter alia the availability of resources among 
other equally important factors. In order to constitute constitutional compliance, the state must at least 
attempt to ensure the realisation of the minimum essential levels necessary for the enjoyment of the 
relevant right. The Court declined to determine a minimum core in respect of the right of access to 
adequate housing, opting rather to emphasise the requirement of reasonableness. Therefore, as explained, 
the minimum core obligation may be used as a measuring stick when determining the reasonableness of a 
particular measure taken.  
4.2.4 Right of access to  
Article 11(1) of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights
74 
provides for the 
right to adequate housing as opposed to section 26(1) of the Constitution, which provides for the right of 
access to adequate housing. Initially this has been understood  
 
 
 
71   Grootboom Constitutional Court case par [33], see also TAC-case par [34].  
72   It must be remembered that s 26(1) and 26(2) do not give rise to self-standing rights. These rights should be read together as 
defining the scope of the positive rights and the corresponding obligations on the state to 'respect, protect, promote, and 
fulfil' such rights. See Grootboom Constitutional Court case par [34]. This is also the case regarding s 27 of the 
Constitution as concluded in the TAC case. Here the argument was that s 27(1) and 27(2) were distinct rights and created 
two obligations on the state: one to give effect to s 27(1), and the other to do so through 'reasonable legislative and other 
measures, within its available measures'. The obligation created by s 27(1) has a minimum core to which everyone in need 
is entitled. For a detailed discussion, see TAC case par [26-39]. This argument was substantially similar to the one put 
forward in the Grootboom case, therefore, it is not surprising that the Court followed its earlier conclusion that ss (1) and 
(2) are linked.  
73   Soobramoney case par [31].  
74  International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, adopted and proclaimed by the United Nations General 
Assembly Resolution 2200 A (XXI) of 1966.  Hereafter referred to as the ICESCR. South Africa has signed the Covenant 
in 1994, but has not yet ratified it.  
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as an attempt to avoid an interpretation that this section creates and unqualified obligation on the state to 
guarantee free housing on demand to everyone.
75 
 
However, in the Grootboom case, the Court stated that the qualification of the right to housing recognises 
that housing entails more than bricks and mortar; it requires available land, appropriate services such as 
the provision of water and the removal of sewage, and the financing of all these, including the building of 
the house itself. A right of access to adequate housing/shelter suggests that it is not only the state that is 
responsible for the provision of houses, but that other members of society must be enabled by legislative 
and other measures to provide housing/shelter.
76 
Thus, the state must create the infrastructure, in which the 
right to adequate housing/shelter can be realised, while taking into account the different economic levels 
in society. This is in line with the state's direct and indirect duty in terms of section 28(1)(c) as explained 
above.  
4.3 Enforcement of section 28(1)(c)  
 
The implementation and successful enforcement of children's socio-economic rights, such as the right to 
basic shelter necessitates integrated development strategies.
77 
• Firstly, the nature of the existing situation with respect to the right to basic shelter must be 
ascertained. The object of this analysis would be to identify the key problems (such as homelessness and 
overpopulation), which need to be addressed in order to facilitate the progressive realisation of the right in 
question effectively.
There is a growing awareness that the 
purpose of development work is to promote and to protect human rights – specifically social, economic 
and cultural rights. What is proposed is a four-step planning and implementation strategy.  
• Secondly, effective planning of action in the children's rights field requires the setting of goals 
and standards. In other words, a child's right to basic shelter needs to be converted into verifiable goals or 
objectives, achievable within agreed upon periods.
78 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
75  Davis, Cheadle and Haysom Fundamental Rights 345.  
76  Grootboom Constitutional Court case par [35].  See also Jansenvan Rensburg and Olivier 2001 Law,  
     Democracy and Development 92.  
77   Himes Implementing the CRC 21. 78 Id 21. 79 Id 21-22.  
79 
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• Thirdly, a comprehensive action plan has to be developed to reach the set goals. This action plan 
can manifest itself in reasonable legislative and other measures, which recognise that the implementation 
thereof is subject to resource availability. In this regard, it must be remembered that all measures taken 
whether legislative or otherwise must be reasonable in their conception and formulation.
• The fourth step entails the effective implementation of these measures.
80 
 
 
Two distinct kinds of norm enforcement play a role in the implementation of socio-economic rights in 
South Africa. In the first instance, focus will be on the adversarial enforcement mechanisms of the courts. 
Thereafter, inquisitorial mechanisms such as the South African Human Rights Commission will be 
discussed.  
4.3.1 Judicial enforcement  
In Fose v Minister of Safety and Security
81 
 
82
 the Constitutional Court stated that, due to the supremacy of 
the Constitution,
83
 all unconstitutional law or conduct is invalid. This is in line with section 172(1)(a), 
which provides that, when deciding a constitutional matter, a court must declare that any law or conduct 
that is inconsistent with the Constitution, is invalid to the extent of its inconsistency.
84 
 
When applied to the enforcement of children's right to basic shelter, section 172(1)(a) begs the argument 
that a programme which is designed to facilitate access to adequate housing in terms of section 26(1), 
read together with section 26(2), and does not expressly provide for the needs of children, or fail to regard 
their interests as paramount, does not constitute constitutional compliance, and is therefore invalid. The 
same argument can be voiced in regard to children without parents to whom the state has a direct 
responsibility to provide the necessary shelter in terms of section 28(1)(c).  
From reading the rest of section 172(1) it becomes clear that the declaration of invalidity is not the only 
remedy a court can award. Section 172(1)(b) provides that "a court may make any  
 
 
 
 
 
80   Grootboom Constitutional Court case par [42].  
81   Himes Implementing the CRC 22.  
82   Fose v Minister of Safety and Security 1997 3 SA 786 (CC) par [87]. Hereafter referred to as the Fose case.  
83   S 2 of the Constitution states: "This Constitution is the supreme law of the Republic; law or conduct inconsistent with it is 
invalid, and the obligations imposed by it must be fulfilled."  
84   De Waal, Currie and Erasmus Bill of Rights 170-171; Davis, Cheadle and Haysom Fundamental Rights 351.  
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order that is just and equitable". Furthermore, section 38
85
 of the Constitution provides for  
"appropriate relief", and specifically refers to a declaration of rights where fundamental rights  
have been infringed. In the Fose case, the Court concluded that:
86 
 
Appropriate relief will in essence be relief that is required to protect and enforce the Constitution. Depending on the 
circumstances of each particular case, the relief may be a declaration of rights, an interdict, a mandamus, or such 
other relief as may be required to ensure that the rights enshrined in the Constitution are protected and enforced. If it 
is necessary to do so, the courts may even have to fashion new remedies to secure the protection and enforcement of 
these all-important rights.  
 
The Court's statement regarding appropriate relief makes it clear that the object in awarding any remedy 
must be to protect the rights contained in the Constitution effectively.
87
 This means that the remedy must 
at least vindicate the Constitution and deter future infringements. Specific constitutional remedies used by 
the Court include the following:
88 
Orders of invalidity;
89
 the development of the common law to give effect 
to the constitutional rights;
90
 constitutional damages;
91
 interdicts;
92
 and a declaration of rights.
93 
 
 
The High Court in Grootboom v Oostenberg Municipality
94
 extensively used the structured interdict
95
 to 
enforce a positive obligation. The Court found that the conditions under which the  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
85   S 38 provides: "Anyone listed in this section has the right to approach a competent Court, alleging that a right in the Bill of 
Rights has been infringed or threatened, and the Court may grant appropriate relief, including a declaration of rights."  
86   Fose case par [19].  
87   Fose case par [96]. See also the discussion in De Waal, Currie and Erasmus Bill of Rights 173; Davis, Cheadle and Haysom 
Fundamental Rights 351; Sanderson v Attorney General, Eastern Cape 1998 2 SA 38 (CC).  
88   Jansen van Rensburg and Olivier 2001 Law, Democracy and Development 95; De Waal, Currie and Erasmus Bill of Rights 
451-454; Davis, Cheadle and Haysom Fundamental Rights 354.  
89   In terms of s 172(1) (b) a court can make an order limiting the retrospective effect of the declaration of invalidity, also a 
court can make an order suspending the declaration of invalidity, to allow the competent authority to correct the defect. See 
De Waal, Currie and Erasmus Bill of Rights 175-188.  
90   S 173 of the Constitution; see also Carmichele v Minister of Safety and Security 2001 4 SA 938 (CC) for the Court's use of 
this inherent power.  
91   De Waal, Currie and Erasmus Bill of Rights 188-191; see also Fose v Minister of Safety and Security 1997 3 SA 786 (CC).  
92   De Waal, Currie and Erasmus Bill of Rights 191-193; see City Council of Pretoria v Walker 1995 4 SA 631 (CC).  
93   This remedy, in terms of s 38, is only applicable to infringement of rights entrenched in the Bill of Rights. In JT Publishing v 
Minister of Safety and Security 1997 3 SA 514 (CC) par [15], the Court held that a declaratory order is a discretionary 
remedy, in the sense that the court is not obliged to make such order even if the matter in question is capable of being 
answered in that way. See De Waal, Currie and Erasmus Bill of Rights 193-194.  
94   Grootboom High Court case.  
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squatters were living, were a violation of the right of children to shelter in terms of section 28(1)(c). 
Reference was also made to section 26 in respect of the conditions in which the children's parents were 
living. According to the High Court, section 38 and section 172 of the Constitution permit the issuing of 
an order, which identifies the violation of a constitutional right and then defines the reform that must be 
implemented while affording the responsible agency the opportunity to choose the means of compliance.
96 
In this case, the High Court ordered the state to provide the necessary emergency shelter to the children 
and their accompanying parent(s).
97 
 
On appeal, the Constitutional Court held in the Grootboom case that the High Court's interpretation of the 
relevant constitutional provisions was incorrect. The right to housing did not give the applicants a right to 
claim housing immediately on demand. Therefore, the remedy for the infringement could not put the 
applicants in a preferential position as opposed to people in similar situations that were not party to the 
litigation.
98 
The Constitutional Court held that due to the pragmatic nature of socio-economic rights, it was 
necessary and appropriate to award a declaratory order.
99 
 
The question may be asked whether the Court, in respect of socio-economic rights in general, can only 
make declaratory orders, or can it, when appropriate implement mandatory orders. It must, however, be 
remembered that due to South Africa's system of judicial hierarchy, the Constitutional Court judgment 
represents the present legal position.  
In Minister of Health v Treatment Action Campaign
100
 counsel for government contended that if the Court 
should find that government policies fall short of the constitutional requirements, the only competent 
order that a court can make is to issue a declaration of rights to that effect.
101
 The making of government 
policy is a prerogative of the executive and not the court, therefore, so the argument went, any other 
order, which requires the executive to pursue a  
 
 
 
95   A structured interdict is employed to direct a violator to take steps to rectify a violation of the rights under the court's 
supervision.  
96   Grootboom High Court case par 293H-J. See also Davis, Cheadle and Haysom Fundamental Rights 354.  
97   Grootboom High Court case par 293I.  
98   Grootboom Constitutional Court case par [79-81].  
99   Grootboom Constitutional Court case par [99].  
100   Minister of Health v Treatment Action Campaign 2002 10 BCLR 1033 (CC) par [96].  
101   See also Davis, Cheadle and Haysom Fundamental Rights 354.  
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particular policy, was undemocratic in so far that it is inconsistent with the doctrine of separation of 
powers.
102 
 
The Court's obligation to declare unconstitutional law or conduct invalid in terms of section 172 is also 
applicable to government policies. This then serves as a constitutional mandate for the intrusion upon the 
executive's domain. The Court further held that that there is no merit in the distinction drawn between 
declaratory and mandatory orders - even a simple declaration of rights might have budgetary 
implications.
103
  Referring to the Fose case, the Court emphasised that it is under a duty to ensure that 
appropriate and effective relief is granted. The nature of the right infringed, and the nature of the 
infringement will provide guidance as to the appropriate relief in a particular case.  
Therefore, the Court rejected the argument that it could only make declaratory orders due to the 
contention that mandatory orders are inconsistent with the doctrine of separation of  
104 
powers. 
In this respect the Court also stated that the power to grant mandatory relief, where appropriate, might 
include the exercise of some sort of judicial supervisory jurisdiction.
105
  This entails that the courts would 
give orders directing the legislature and executive branches of government to bring about reforms defined 
in terms of their objective and then to retain such supervisory jurisdiction as to the implementation of 
those reforms.
106
 In other words, the Court or other institution may retain jurisdiction so as to ensure and 
supervise the implementation of the ordered reforms.  An example of this new practice is found in the 
Grootboom case, where the Constitutional Court awarded the Human Rights Commission supervisory 
jurisdiction to ensure the effective implementation of the necessary policy reforms.
107  
 
 
102  TAC case par [97]. This is similar to the Court's conclusion in the First Certification judgment, where it was argued that 
socio-economic rights were not justiciable because it is inconsistent with the doctrine of separation of powers. Certification 
of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996 1996 4 SA 744 (CC) par [77].  
103  TAC case par [99].  
104  TAC case par [106].  
105  TAC case par [104].  
106  Jansen van Rensburg and Olivier 2001 Law, Democracy and Development 95; Jansen van Rensburg Sosiale Sekerheid 247.  
107  Grootboom Constitutional Court case par [97].  
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4.3.2 Monitoring the enforcement of socio-economic rights  
To ensure the effective realisation of the totality of obligations engendered by the economic, social, and 
cultural rights of everyone, especially those conferred upon children, a mix of official and non-
governmental monitoring mechanisms are necessary.
108 
 
The South African Human Rights Commission was established by section 184 of the Constitution, which 
serves as a similar monitoring mechanism on municipal level. Section 184(3) provides:  
 
Each year, the Human Rights Commission must require relevant organs of state to provide the Commission with 
information on the measures that they have taken towards the realisation of the rights in the Bill of Rights concerning 
housing, health care, food, water, social security, education, and the environment.
109  
 
It is submitted that the objective of these reporting procedures is inspection and introspection. The 
performance of the relevant state organ is assessed from the outside by the Human Rights Commission, 
but in the process, the organ itself is also compelled to look at what it has achieved in respect of children's 
socio-economic rights in a critical way. In this way an obligation of internal and external justification is 
placed on the state.
110
 Though the Human Rights Commission will most likely never be directly involved 
in the enforcement of socioeconomic rights in general, the yearly reports received by them may play a 
vital role in litigation.  From these reports the progress made in the realisation of socio-economic rights 
can be judged. The reports may also provide the basis for the elaboration of government policies in the 
future.
111 
 
In the South African Human Rights Commission's most recent findings and recommendations concerning 
the measures adopted by government to execute its obligation in terms of section 26 the Commission 
supported the Court's conclusion in the Grootboom case that the question in this regard is whether the 
measures adopted establish an integrated coherent programme  
 
 
 
 
108  Jansen van Rensburg Sosiale Sekerheid 305-306, Himes Implementing the CRC 22; Franklin Children's Rights 15. 
109  Own emphasis. 
110   Kollapen Annual Economic and Social Rights Report 13 of the South African Human Rights Commission  
      (SAHRC: 2000-2002).  
111   Jansen van Rensburg Sosiale Sekerheid 420-421; De Vos 1997 SAJHR 99.  
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involving all three spheres of government, directed towards the progressive realisation of the right of 
access to adequate housing within the State's available resources.
112 
 
The Court in the Grootboom case stated that housing involves more than bricks and mortar.
113 
The 
Commission has accepted this statement when it stated that the National Department of Housing should 
understand that housing is not merely about numbers and targets, but involves the quality of the living 
environment.
114
 In this regard, the Commission stated that housing projects should look after the 
ecological support system upon which all life depends.
115
 The Commission further emphasised with 
reference to the Grootboom case,
116
 that the programme developed to address emergency housing needs 
should be sufficiently flexible to respond to those in desperate need and to cater for immediate and short-
term requirements whenever such need arises.
117 
 
'Habitability' is considered one of the factors when determining whether a particular form of shelter 
constitutes adequate housing. Adequate housing will be considered habitable if it "provides the 
inhabitants with adequate space and protection from cold, damp, heat, rain, wind or other threats to 
health, structural hazards and disease vectors".
118
 Unfortunately, the Commission concluded that most of 
the new housing projects in South Africa fall short of this definition.
119 
It is not surprising that the 
Commission expressly stated that this problem is one of the major barriers facing the improvement of the 
quality of life for the poor, especially children.
120 
 
The Commission further listed several aspects detrimental to the successful implementation of measures 
adopted to facilitate the realisation of section 26 that should be remedied.
121
 These aspects include the 
unavailability of suitable land, the delay in transferring land to the beneficiaries due to administrative 
problems, problems due to inexperienced developers and  
 
 
 
112  Kollapen Annual Economic and Social Rights Report 47 (SAHRC: 2000-2002).  
113  Grootboom Constitutional Court case par [35].  
114  Id par [35].  
115  Kollapen Annual Economic and Social Rights Report 59 (SAHRC: 2000-2002).  
116  Grootboom Constitutional Court case par [66].  
117  Kollapen Annual Economic and Social Rights Report 51 (SAHRC: 2000-2002).  
118  Id 51 (SAHRC: 2000-2002).  
119  Id 51 (SAHRC: 2000-2002).  
120  Id 59-60 (SAHRC: 2000-2002). Own emphasis. 
121  Id 52-53 and 60 (SAHRC: 2000-2002).  
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quality of products, issues concerning the security of tenure and inadequate budget allocations.
122 
 
Most importantly for the purpose of this article is the fact that the Commission found that most of the 
submitted reports do not clearly articulate the measures and the extent of the impact of the measures 
adopted on the lives of the vulnerable groups within their areas of jurisdiction.
123 
The National Housing 
Subsidy Scheme serves as example in that it requires beneficiaries to be over the age of twenty-one and 
legally competent to qualify for housing subsidies. This has the direct effect of excluding individual 
children and child-headed households.
124
 The Commission strongly recommended that national 
government must adopt policies and enact legislation or develop a strategy to alleviate difficulties facing 
these children.
125 
 
 
Conclusion: Findings and Recommendations   
Poverty is a worldwide phenomenon, which is most evident in third world countries.  South Africa falls in 
this category as a developing state. Children being the most vulnerable members of society are the one's 
most affected by living in poverty. This unacceptable situation can inter alia be attributed to the 
disastrous effects of Apartheid. During this unfortunate period in our nation's history millions of people 
were unjustly evicted from their homes and forced to live in deplorable conditions. Moreover, many of 
these people were left homeless or without the necessary adequate shelter. Children who were born into 
these circumstances were denied basic resources such as proper shelter, food, water and health care 
services.    
These unfortunate circumstances existed at the adoption of South Africa's democratic Constitution. The 
preamble of the Constitution reaffirms government's commitment to heal the inequalities of the past and 
improve the quality of life of all citizens. The Constitution is based on certain fundamental values, most 
importantly, human dignity, freedom and equality. The fact that these values are denied to those people 
living without access to basic resources such as adequate housing/shelter, food, water or health care 
services cannot be dismissed. To facilitate South Africa's development as a democratic state based on 
human dignity, freedom and equality, the problem of poverty must be addressed.  
122  Id 52-53 (SAHRC: 2000-2002).  
123  Id 56 (SAHRC: 2000-2002).  
124  Id 56 (SAHRC: 2000-2002). 
125  Id 61 (SAHRC: 2000-2002).  
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The Constitutional Court, in the Grootboom case, has recently stated that the effective realisation of 
socio-economic rights is key to the advancement of a value based democratic South Africa. The 
Constitution provides everyone with fundamentally entrenched socioeconomic rights by virtue of sections 
25(5), 26 and 27. Furthermore, section 28(1)(c) provides children with additional socio-economic rights 
and the right to basic shelter is expressly provided for.  
By virtue of section 28(1)(b) the primary responsibility to provide children with the necessary adequate 
housing/shelter is vested in their parents, unless the parents are unable to fulfil their duty or the children 
are removed from their care. This provision is in line with the binding principles of the Convention on the 
Rights of the Child. This does not in the least mean that the state has no responsibilities to children living 
with their parents. The state must still provide the framework in which parents can facilitate the 
realisation of their children's rights.  The state can fulfil this obligation by taking reasonable legislative 
and other measures within its available resources to realise everyone's right of access to adequate housing 
progressively. Therefore, it is submitted that the measures taken to realise section 26 also indirectly 
ensures the realisation of children's right to basic shelter (section 28(1)(c)).  
It has been largely accepted by the courts and academics alike that all fundamental human rights are 
indivisible and interrelated. Clearly then, the state's obligations in terms of section 28(1)(c) cannot be 
properly interpreted without referring to the interpretation of those obligations conferred upon it by 
section 26(2) and the other socio-economic rights in the Constitution. Hence, section 28(1)(c) must be 
seen in the context of the Constitution as a whole.  Put simply, the state must take reasonable legislative 
and other measures within its available resources to realise children's right to basic housing/shelter 
progressively.  
The Constitutional Court in the Grootboom case could not over emphasise the importance of the 
reasonableness requirement. The Court stated that the legislative and other measures taken to realise the 
right will not be reasonable if it fails to provide for the protection of those most in need. Thus, it is 
convincingly argued that measures taken to realise the right of access to adequate housing (thereby, 
indirectly also realising children's right to basic shelter), which do not consider the interest of children to 
be paramount, will not constitute constitutional compliance due to lack of reasonableness.  
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The state's obligations in this regard are further qualified by the fact that measures have to be taken within 
available resources. This reflects the reality that is the economy in which the state operates. To comply, 
the state must show that it, at the very least, satisfies the minimum essential levels necessary for the 
enjoyment of adequate housing/shelter. This refers to the state's minimum core obligation. Unfortunately, 
the Constitutional Court in the Grootboom case, recently refused an open invitation to define the 
minimum core in respect to section 26. The Court stated with just cause that it did not have sufficient 
information before it to take on such a daunting task.  
While accepting the present legal position, it is submitted that an established minimum core would have 
some far-reaching advantages such as providing socio-economic rights with more determinacy and 
certainty. This would have had the effect that goals and strategies in terms of realising the right to 
adequate housing/shelter could be more realistically established. Hence, legislative and other measures 
would be much more comprehensive, not to mention effective. Furthermore, defining a minimum core 
obligation would have greatly eased the enforcement of socio-economic rights as far as the courts would 
have had a minimum standard against which to judge the measures taken.  
The measures taken must then also ensure the progressive realisation of the right in question,  
i.e. the right of access to adequate housing. This qualification recognises that socio-economic rights 
cannot be realised immediately and on demand. However, the state must still show that it has at least 
made some progress toward the full realisation of the right in question.   
The realisation of socio-economic rights to alleviate poverty requires an integrated action plan 
encompassing various strategies, projects and programmes implemented in all three spheres of 
government. The South African Human Rights Commission has confirmed that every level of 
government whether national, provincial, or local has a particular role to play in the response to poverty. 
Thus, the principle of co-operative government is essential.  
Children hold our nation's future in their hands. To ensure that our country and its inhabitants reach their 
full potential, the problem of poverty, especially child poverty and its devastating effects must be 
seriously addressed. To do this, people on all levels of society need to forgive the past and embrace the 
future together. The key word is solidarity in a prosperous South Africa.   
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